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ABSTRACT 
We characterize the situation in the Spanish banking industry through the identification of 
strategic groups. We use a 13-year dataset for the period 1992–2004 and a sophisticated 
statistical model to identify these strategic groups. The primary contribution of this empirical 
study is to model the evolution of these strategic groups using a time inhomogeneous hidden 
Markov model (HMM) in which the time variable transition matrix captures institutions’ 
group switching behavior. We consider a mixture model is the data generating process. Two 
strategic groups are identified. These groups are primarily characterized by size and other 
strategic variables. The probability of remaining in a group is generally high: 87.28% for SG1 
and 61.84% for SG2. The probability of switching groups is low: 12.72% probability of 
switching from SG1 to SG2 and 38.16% probability of switching from SG2 to SG1. Banks in 
SG1 seem more stable over time; they have low levels of switching behavior and well-defined 
long-term behavior. Banks in SG2 seem to evolve in terms of group membership. 
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Since Hunt’s (1972) seminal work, the concept of strategic groups has generated a rich stream 
of literature.1 A strategic group is a set of firms that use the same or similar strategies 
according to some strategic dimensions, resulting in homogeneous competitive actions within 
an industry (Caves & Porter 1977; Cool & Schendel 1987). Scholars continue to discuss 
strategic groups because of their impact on certain decisions that the firm must take. For 
example, strategic groups may affect the nature of competition within an industry. 
In the strategic group literature, there is controversy regarding not only the usefulness of the 
concept for advancing strategic management research but also the question of whether 
strategic groups actually exist and, if so, what method is most suitable for identifying them 
(Murthi et al. 2013). Therefore, correctly identifying strategic groups and assessing how well 
they characterize a particular industry is primarily an empirical question, the answers to which 
provide valuable input to managerial decisions. In this stream of research, cluster analysis is 
probably the most popular method of identifying strategic groups (Mascarenhas & Aaker 
1989; Fiegenbaum & Thomas 1990). Most of the cited studies focus on selecting variables 
that capture product market and resource commitments and applying cluster analysis across 
stable periods (González-Moreno & Sáez-Martínez 2008) based largely on heuristic 
procedures like Ward’s method and k-means (Tuma et al. 2011). However, the generally 
weak statistical basis of such methods is a major drawback, and crucial segmentation 
questions such as determining the optimal number of segments cannot be answered 
satisfactorily by heuristic procedures. In addition, understanding the dynamics of strategic 
groups enriches traditional models of industrial economics and the strategic management 
literature.  
Consequently, a primary goal of recent strategic group research has been to improve 
 
1 For detailed reviews of this literature, see McGee & Thomas (1986), Thomas & Venkatraman (1988), Ketchen 
et al. (2004), and DeSarbo et al. (2009). 
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theoretical and methodological techniques to identify groups over time. Accordingly, other 
methods have been proposed to overcome the limitations of cluster analysis and advance 
research on how best to identify strategic group dynamics. Some of the most recent advances 
in this field include a new cluster technique known as MCLUST (Zuñiga-Vicente et al. 2004), 
spatial clusterwise multidimensional scaling (DeSarbo et al. 2008, 2009), latent class 
regression analysis (Murthi et al. 2013), finite mixture-based models (DeSarbo et al. 2010), 
and hidden Markov models (Ebbes et al. 2010). All of these techniques have been developed 
to capture the varying, dynamic nature of strategic groups over time.  
We present analysis of strategic groups in a specific industry using a sophisticated method 
that overcomes some of the aforementioned empirical criticisms. We enrich the literature by 
empirically addressing three considerations. First, we explore whether strategic groups existed 
and, if so, what form these groups took in the Spanish banking industry between 1992 and 
2004. To do so, we use an enhanced version of the hidden Markov model (HMM) applied by 
Ebbes et al. (2010). Specifically, we propose an inhomogeneous HMM (instead of the 
homogeneous HMM proposed by the aforementioned authors). In this inhomogeneous HMM, 
the time-variable transition matrix captures institutions’ group switching behavior between 
two years (t and t+1) in the study period. From a technical perspective, we extend the HMM 
by employing initial values for the priors adjusted to the data. Doing so adds flexibility 
because it allows us to control the amount of information included in the priors. 
Consequently, we allow for time-varying parameters in the distributions to analyze the 
evolution of strategic group membership in this industry. This enables us to detect changes in 
group strategy, changes in membership, and the stability of groups over time. This 
contribution expands the set of available tools to enable more accurate analysis of the 
dynamics of strategic groups. Second, we compare our proposed model with suitable 
benchmark models to examine its performance in explaining and diagnosing the evolution of 
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strategic group membership in an industry. Finally, we delineate the strategic dimensions, or 
variables, to test for performance differences between groups. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a brief literature 
review, primarily focusing on strategic group research and the characteristics of the Spanish 
banking industry. The method is described in Section 3, and the variables are defined and 
operationalized. We present the results in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the key 
conclusions and implications of our study and consider possible avenues for future research. 
 
2. THEORY: LITERATURE REVIEW  
We begin this section with a brief review of the strategic group literature. We then 
justify the choice of the Spanish banking industry as the setting for our study.  
2.1 Strategic group research 
The strategic group literature includes the following major streams of research: the 
emergence of groups, within- and between-group rivalry, performance differences between 
groups, and the stability of group structures (Mas-Ruiz et al. 2014). We review each of these 
four streams separately.  
The emergence of strategic groups. Several theories have attempted to explain the 
existence and creation of strategic groups. The earliest theories are based on differences in 
firms’ assets and capabilities or attitudes toward risk (Caves & Porter 1977). These 
differences lead firms to invest in barriers to mobility and in forming groups. Tang & Thomas 
(1992) report that economic models of spatial competition and cognitive models of 
competitive structure can also explain the creation of strategic groups. Peteraf & Shanley 
(1997) define the identity of a strategic group as a set of mutual understandings that derive 
from interactions and ensure that members are aware of the logic that underpins their behavior 
and can therefore predict how other group members are likely to react. Dranove et al. (1998) 
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affirm that group-level effects on performance derive from strategic interactions among 
members. While strategic interactions and existing relations are critical to group-level effects 
on performance, mobility barriers help sustain these group-level effects by limiting entry to 
the group and enhancing strategic interactions among members (Más-Ruiz et al. 2014). 
Dranove et al.’s (1998) approach meets the scientific criterion of falsifiability in that a finding 
that showed the absence of systematic variation in profitability across groups would be 
equivalent to a finding that showed the non-existence of strategic groups (Murthi et al. 2013). 
Rivalry within and between strategic groups. The literature that examines whether the 
degree of rivalry differs within and between groups is ambiguous (Porter 1976, 1979; Peteraf 
1993; Cool & Dierickx 1993; Smith et al. 1997). On the one hand, several studies provide 
evidence that rivalry between strategic groups is greater than rivalry within groups (Caves & 
Porter 1977; Porter 1976, Peteraf 1993). Based on the resource-based view of the firm, these 
studies suggest that members of the same group have similar resources, so they will act and 
react to competitive disturbances similarly. On the other hand, Gimeno & Woo (1996) 
suggest that greater strategic distance makes tacit coordination easier by signaling whether a 
rival has overstepped its tacit boundary. According to the resource-based view of the firm, a 
greater within-group rivalry could result from homogeneity of resources among members 
(Barney 1991; Bogner & Thomas 1994) because each firm strives to achieve the same goals 
but does not have unique resources or isolation mechanisms that enable the firm to gain a 
competitive advantage (Smith et al. 1997).  
Performance difference between groups. The earliest studies of this relationship 
indicate that owing to barriers to mobility, which produce rigidities, members of strategic 
groups have a relative cost advantage over other firms (Porter 1979). Thus, differences in 
performance between group members and outsiders tend to persist in the medium to long term 
(McGee & Thomas 1986). Thomas & Venkatraman (1988), Leask & Parker (2007), and Nair 
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& Kotha (2001), among others, report performance differences across strategic groups. 
However, empirical evidence remains inconclusive. Other studies have shown that mobility 
barriers provide insufficient theoretical support for the link between group membership and 
performance (Cool & Schendel 1987, 1988; Frazier & Howell 1983). Group members are 
keenly aware of their mutual dependence and often react in the same fashion to the same 
external stimuli (Caves & Porter 1977). This mutual dependence of firms within a strategic 
group makes the development of tacit agreements between member firms easier, which 
prevents other firms from becoming members.  
Stability of a group structure. This stream of research focuses on understanding 
changes over time in group strategy, strategic group membership, and the number of strategic 
groups (Mascarenhas 1989). Despite certain theoretical developments in the domain of 
strategic groups that suggest that strategic group membership appears to be stable over time 
(Mascarenhas and Aaker 1989), most studies provide evidence that firms within a strategic 
group evolve (e.g., Ruiz 1999; Nair & Filer 2003; Rebière & Mavoori 2016). Changes over 
time in a given firm’s strategy tend to be neither random nor uniform. Instead, these changes 
occur at specific moments when the industry suffers a shock of some type. This shock creates 
new opportunities or threats, to which firms react. This response to changes in the 
environment might cause an unusually high number of firms to change their strategies and, 
according to Dranove et al. (1998), could promote the adoption of collective strategies among 
group members. This source of change and discontinuity is an important part of the dynamic 
model of strategic groups. Other scholars (e.g., Cool & Schendel 1987, 1988; Cool & 
Dierickx 1993; Fiegenbaum & Thomas 1990 1993; Fiegenbaum et al. 1987, 1990) argue that 
firms modify their strategies in response not only to changes in the industry environment but 
also to the imitation activities of other firms that attempt to copy their behavior and to the 
market reception of their product positioning. From a strategic management/marketing and 
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economics perspective, studying strategic group dynamics can help identify entry and exit 
barriers at the group level and explain how competitive dynamics change over time (Ebbes et 
al. 2010). 
2.2. Spanish banking industry 
The banking industry is a strategic sector in the global economy. Therefore, numerous 
studies of financial contexts have been carried out from a strategic group perspective. For 
some examples, see Amel & Rhoades (1989), Berg & Kim (1994), DeSarbo & Grewal 
(2008), Burke (1990), Ebbes et al. (2010), Epure et al. (2011), Más-Ruiz et al. (2005), Más-
Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno (2011), Más-Ruiz et al. (2014), Ray & Das (2010), Ruiz (1999), Spiller 
& Favaro (1984), and Zuñiga-Vicente et al. (2004). 
According to Más-Ruiz et al. (2005), the Spanish banking market provides an 
interesting scenario for analyzing the domains of strategic groups. The Spanish banking 
industry’s deregulation process ended in 1992. Two types of regulations have exerted a 
particularly strong influence on the Spanish banking industry: the regulation of firm behavior 
through price setting and the regulation of market structure through the control of savings 
banks’ geographical expansion (Gual 1992; García-Cestona & Surroca 2008).  
Despite the liberalization of prices and controls on fees in 1987, the regulation of 
interest rates since the 1960s removed price competition and forced the larger banks to 
compete by investing more in services and proximity to the customer by expanding their 
branch networks. The regulation of the Spanish banking industry’s geographical expansion in 
the 1970s and 1980s created a market where financial firms operated at the national, regional, 
or local level. However, these geographical restrictions applied only to savings banks. 
Accordingly, savings banks were allowed to make strategic geographical choices, but these 
choices were limited to regional or local, but not national, markets. No such limits were 
imposed on commercial banks. Therefore, large financial firms that had branches in numerous 
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regions faced a different (and more diversified) competitive structure and socioeconomic 
reality than small commercial banks and savings banks (Carbó et al. 2003).  
However, factors such as the removal of branching restrictions on savings banks’ 
geographical expansion in 1988 and Spain’s accession to the European Union in 1986 led to 
the concentration of the banking industry. First, the removal of branching restrictions led to 
the nationwide expansion of large savings banks and the defensive formation of small savings 
banks into geographical groups. This defensive formation was achieved through an 
accelerated process of mergers and acquisitions, primarily involving savings banks that 
operated in the same markets. Second, Spain’s accession to the harmonized European 
financial market also led to the consolidation of the banking sector through additional mergers 
and acquisitions, which drastically affected the domestic competitive environment. At the end 
of the 1980s, Spanish banks engaged in mergers and acquisitions to increase their size, 
compete in the broader European market, and preserve market power (Más-Ruiz et al. 2005). 
 
3. METHOD 
As stated in the introduction, the identification of strategic groups is riddled with 
controversy. Scholars such as Day et al. (1995) suggest that inconsistent results in prior 
studies may owe to variation in research designs, the lack of multiple criteria, and 
inappropriate selection methods in the identification of groups. After selecting a stable period, 
researchers face two major problems in identifying the strategic groups within an industry 
(Murthi et al. 2013). First, the composition of groups and the number of groups may vary 
according to the choice of strategic variables. Factor analysis is the most commonly used 
technique to identify relevant variables. The primary risk is that smaller factors derived from 
the factor analysis may be discarded even though these smaller factors may contain the most 
relevant clustering information (DeSarbo et al. 2009). The second problem relates to the 
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choice of the most suitable method to identify the strategic groups. Although cluster analysis 
is the most common method for identifying groups, it has several limitations that are well 
documented in the literature (see Ketchen and Shook (1996), Murthi et al. (2013), and Ebbes 
et al. (2010) for details). DeSarbo et al. (2009) report that different methods provide different 
results for the same dataset.  
Consequently, alternative methods have been proposed to overcome the limitations of 
cluster analysis and find a better way to identify strategic group dynamics. Thus, DeSarbo et 
al. (2009) propose a spatial clusterwise multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique that 
simultaneously identifies the number of strategic groups and strategic group membership, 
derives the underlying dimensions of the strategic groups, and models the evolution of the 
strategic groups over time. Murthi et al. (2013) advocate the use of latent class regression 
analysis, which is also known as a finite mixture model that is used to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data, to create strategic groups based on similarities in the response 
coefficients of variables that are used to explain performance. Ebbes et al. (2010) propose the 
use of a homogeneous hidden Markov models (HMMs), which simultaneously identify 
strategic groups and explicitly model the transition probabilities across the identified strategic 
groups to account for potential time dependencies, enabling them to detect how strategic 
groups evolve over time. For each firm, the HMM approach identifies a strategic time path 
where the successive strategy states are linked through a first-order Markov process. Thus, the 
strategy that a firm adopts at time t depends on the strategy that the firm adopted in the 
previous measurement period. We use this HMM approach as a basis to identify the strategic 
groups and describe the dynamic path of strategic group membership over time. 
3.1. Model 
The assumption that underlies the concept of strategic groups is that groups are internally 
homogeneous but externally heterogeneous; strategic responses to certain market variables 
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will be similar within groups but different among groups. Based on this assumption, we 
classify each financial institution into one of a given number of homogeneous classes. We 
model the evolution of strategic groups using a time inhomogeneous HMM in which the time-
variable transition matrix captures institutions’ group switching behavior between two years (t 
and t+1) in the study period. From a technical perspective, we extend the HMM by 
employing initial values for the priors adjusted to the data. Doing so adds flexibility because it 
allows us to control the amount of information included in the priors. Consequently, we allow 
for time-varying parameters in the distributions to analyze the evolution of strategic group 
membership in this industry. This enables us to detect changes in group strategy, changes in 
membership, and the stability of groups over time.  
Strategic variables can be thought of as realizations of certain processes that characterize the 
groups. However, these hypothetical groups are not observed because the membership 
information has been lost. Therefore, it is straightforward to consider a mixture model is the 
data generating process. If we let K denote the number of such classes, such that k = 2, … , K, 
and 𝑇 denote the number of periods indexed by the discrete time variable 𝑡 (t = 1, … , T), we 
can model the distribution of the observed variables 𝑥𝑡𝑖 for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as the following 
mixture density: 
𝑓(𝑥𝑡𝑖|𝑥𝑡−1, 𝜃𝑡𝑘) = ∑ 𝜔𝑡𝑘𝜑(𝑥𝑡𝑖|𝑧𝑡𝑖 = 𝑘, 𝜃𝑡𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1      (1) 
In Eq. 1, 𝜑 is the multivariate normal density distribution with parameters 𝜃𝑡𝑘 = (𝜇𝑡𝑘, Σ𝑡𝑘), 
where 𝜇 = (𝜇𝑡𝑘) are the mean vectors, Σ = (Σ𝑡𝑘) are the covariance matrices, and 
ℳ𝒩(𝜇𝑡𝑘, Σ𝑡𝑘) or ℳ𝒩(𝜃𝑡𝑘) is the multivariate normal probability distribution. Also in Eq. 1, 
𝜔𝑡𝑘 > 0, ∑ 𝜔𝑡𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 = 1, are the weights or mixing proportions. The densities are taken with 
respect to the Lebesgue measure. In each period, a bank can remain in the same class or 
dynamically change its membership to another class.  
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We assume that the number of classes remains stable over time and that the behavior is 
described by a set of strategic variables represented by an R-dimensional vector 𝑥𝑡𝑖. The 
weights can be thought of as the relative class sizes for the period 𝑡 or the probabilities of 
belonging to a specific class. For a specific period 𝑡, the vector 𝜔𝑡 = (𝜔𝑡1, … , 𝜔𝑡𝐾) provides 
the weight distribution and belongs to the unit simplex ℰ𝐾:  
ℰ𝐾 = {𝜔𝑡 = (𝜔𝑡1, … , 𝜔𝑡𝐾) ∈ ℝ
𝐾|𝜔𝑡 ∙ 1 = 1, 𝜔𝑡𝑘 ∈ (0,1), ∀𝑘, 𝑡}, where 1 is the ℝ
𝐾 vector of 
ones. 
The hidden (or latent) variable that determines membership is embedded in a discrete time 
process with finite space 𝑧𝑡𝑖 ∈ {1, ⋯ , 𝐾}, which is assumed to be an irreducible aperiodic 
Markov chain with respect to t. This variable associates each observation 𝑥𝑡𝑖 with the normal 
distribution from which it is sampled. Consequently, the stochastic pair (𝑥𝑡𝑖 , 𝑧𝑡𝑖) is an HMM. 
Here, (𝑥, 𝑧), which is taken as a data collection, is referred to as the complete data, where 𝑥 is 
the incomplete data and 𝑧 is the vector of hidden variables. The weights can be written in 
terms of the hidden variables as 𝜔𝑡𝑘 = 𝑝(𝑧𝑡𝑖 = 𝑘|𝜗). The initial distribution is thus 𝜔𝑘 ≐
𝜔0𝑘 = 𝑝(𝑧0𝑖 = 𝑘|𝑥𝑡−1, 𝜉), which is assumed to be ergodic and where 𝜔 = (𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝐾) ≐
𝑝(𝑧0𝑖|𝜉).  
Furthermore, conditional on knowing this hidden variable, the random variables 𝑥𝑡𝑖 are 
stochastically independent (Frühwirth-Schnatter 2006). The model becomes 
𝑥𝑡𝑖|𝑧𝑡𝑖~ℳ𝒩(𝜃𝑡𝑘), with 𝑝(𝑧𝑡𝑖 = 𝑘) = 𝜔𝑡𝑘. Accordingly, the latent variable is distributed as a 
multinomial random variable 𝑧𝑡𝑖~ℳ(1; 𝜔𝑡1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑡𝑘). 
We assume a transition matrix (𝜉𝑡), which characterizes the process 𝑧𝑡𝑖 for each bank 𝑖. This 
transition matrix is allowed to change over time because the Markov chain is defined as time 
inhomogeneous. Thus, we can write the transition matrix as 𝜉𝑡𝑗𝑘 = 𝑝(𝑧𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑘|𝑧𝑡−1,𝑖 = 𝑗) 
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Because it is a row-stochastic matrix, 𝜉𝑡𝑗𝑘 ≥ 0; ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ {1, ⋯ , 𝐾}, and ∑ 𝜉𝑡𝑗𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 =
1   ∀𝑡, ∀𝑗 ∈ {1, ⋯ , 𝐾}, where 𝜉𝑡 takes values in the parameter space ℰ𝐾
𝐾. 
The parameters to be estimated are 𝜔, 𝜉 = (𝜉𝑡), and 𝜃 = (𝜃𝑡𝑘), which takes values in the 
parameter space Θ ⊆ ℝ𝑄  for all 𝑘 and 𝑡. The total parameter space to be estimated is Ψ =
Θ𝑇𝐾 × ℰ𝐾−1
𝑇𝐾+1, where Ψ ⊆ ℝ𝑆 and 𝑆 = 𝐾𝑇𝑄 + 𝑇(𝐾 + 1)(𝐾 − 1). We say that the mixture 
density 𝑓 is parametrized by 𝜗 ∈ Ψ.  
Posterior and prior distributions and full conditionals 
Assume that, for each time point 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇, we obtain from the mixture 𝑓 a sample of 𝑁 
independent and identically distributed draws 𝑥 = (𝑥𝑡𝑖)𝑖=1,⋯,𝑁;𝑡=1,⋯,𝑇, 𝑥 ∈ ℝ
𝑅. In addition, the 
density of 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥𝑠𝑖)𝑖=1,⋯,𝑁;𝑠=𝑡 is allowed to depend on 𝑥𝑡−1. To construct the mixture 
likelihood function, we assume that the random variables (𝑥𝑡𝑖) for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 and 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁 are stochastically independent, conditional on knowing 𝑧𝑖 (Ebbes et al. 2010). 
Therefore, the likelihood function reads:  







The expanded expression has 𝐾𝑇 terms, leading to a problem that is computationally too 
expensive even for a modest set of observations (Casella et al. 2004). Moreover, the form of 
the likelihood function gives rise to multiple local maxima or even a function that is 
unbounded (Young 2008). This complexity also precludes the use of Bayes’ estimators, 
inasmuch as the resulting expression for the posterior is 𝑝(𝜗|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑙(𝜃|𝑥𝑖)𝑝(𝜗), where 𝑝(𝜗) 
is the prior for the parameter set Θ. The likelihood has to be understood as comprising a 
collection of paths followed by each bank 𝑖. The standard procedure to deal with the 
dimensionality problem is to exploit the HMM structure of the model. Thus, the complete 
data likelihood, 𝐿(𝑥𝑖, z𝑖|𝜗) = 𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑧𝑖, 𝜗)𝑝(𝑧𝑖|𝜗), is used. We assume that the prior 
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distribution is of the form 𝑝(𝜗) = ∏ 𝑝(𝜃𝑘)𝑝(𝜉)𝑘 . Given this expression for the likelihood, the 
complete data posterior distribution is therefore: 




𝑡=1 )𝑝(𝑧0𝑖|𝜉)  (2) 
The model includes the constants 𝛿 = (𝛾, 𝜆, 𝜏, 𝜐, 𝛽) for 𝑘 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐾 and 𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑇, and the 
parameters (𝜔, 𝜉, 𝜇, Σ). The priors, which depend on the vector of constants 𝛿, are chosen in 
such a way that they are conjugated to the following complete data likelihood: 
𝜔~𝒟(𝛾); 𝜉𝑡𝑗~𝒟(𝛾) 





−1|𝜇𝑡𝑘, 𝑥, 𝑧~𝒲𝑟(𝜐, 𝛽𝑘)        (3) 
where 𝒟 is the Dirichlet distribution of order 𝐾 with parameters 𝛾 = (𝛾𝑘), 𝛾𝑘 > 0; 𝒩𝑟 is the 
multivariate normal distribution with r-dimensional vector mean 𝜆𝑡𝑘, 𝜆 = (𝜆𝑡𝑘), and Σ𝑡𝑘/𝜏𝑡𝑘 
is the 𝑟 × 𝑟 −dimensional covariance matrix where 𝜏 = (𝜏𝑡𝑘) are the adjusting parameters; 
and 𝒲𝑟 is the Wishart distribution of an 𝑟 × 𝑟 −dimensional positive definite and symmetric 
matrix with 𝜐 degrees of freedom and fixed positive definite scale matrices 𝛽 = (𝛽𝑘).  
3.2. Estimation 
To estimate the model parameters, we use a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm 
by constructing a Markov chain in Ψ, whose stationary (equilibrium) distribution is the 
complete data posterior distribution. To create the Markov chain, we use the Gibbs sampler 
(via the Clifford–Hammersley theorem), in which a sample of each parameter is successively 
drawn from the posterior conditional on the other parameters and the data. The simulations 
are used to estimate expectations of functions 𝑓: Ψ → ℝ with respect to the posterior: 
𝐸[𝑓(𝜗, 𝑧)|𝑥] = ∬ 𝑓(𝜗, 𝑧)𝑝(𝜗, 𝑧|𝑥)𝑑𝜗𝑑𝑧      (4) 
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These functions can be, for example, posterior moments of parameters or state variables such 
as 𝐸[𝜃|𝑥], 𝐸[𝑧|𝑥], or 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃|𝑥). Given the simulations (𝜗𝑖, 𝑧𝑖)~𝑝(𝜗, 𝑧|𝑥) for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, the 








This estimate converges a.s. to Eq. (4) as 𝑁 → ∞ under certain regularity conditions (Roberts 
& Smith, 1994). It is therefore customary to determine the full conditionals from the complete 
data posterior to be able to apply Gibbs sampling in order to extract random samples from the 
posterior distribution. After some manipulation of the equations in Eq. (3) we arrive at the 
following: 
𝜔𝑘~𝒟(𝛾𝑘 + 𝑁𝑘); 𝜉𝑡𝑘~𝒟(𝛾𝑘 + 𝑁𝑘) 









−1|𝜇𝑡𝑘, 𝑥, 𝑧~𝒲𝑟(𝜐 + 𝑁𝑘 , 𝛽𝑘 + 𝑀𝑡𝑘
𝑉 + 𝑆𝑡𝑘
𝑉 )     (5), where  
𝑆𝑡𝑘










𝑉 = (𝜇𝑡𝑘 − 𝜆𝑡𝑘)(𝜇𝑡𝑘 − 𝜆𝑡𝑘)′       (6) 
where 𝐼{𝑧𝑡𝑖=𝑘} is the indicator function that takes the value 1 when the condition in curly 
brackets is met, and 0 otherwise. The latent variable 𝑧𝑡𝑖 is sampled from the conditional 
posterior distribution 𝑃(𝑧𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝜗). The multimove method (Frühwirth-Schnatter 2006) relies 
on the forward filtering backward sampling algorithm implemented for each path 𝑧𝑖 as a 
mathematical object. 
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Although convergence diagnosis has been developed, see Cowles & Carlin (1996), the 
accuracy of the results is unclear (Andrieu et al. 2003; Flegal & Gong, 2013), and theoretical 
results are not always directly applicable. We approach the issue heuristically and search for 
stationarity in the parameters. From initial experiments, we determine a fixed length of 10,000 
steps. We also discard the initial transient, specifying a burn-in period of 10% of the total 
iterations. 
It is important to consider label switching. Each component of the complete data likelihood 
function of a mixture model—Eq. (2)—cannot be differentiated to each other because they are 
exchangeable. In other words, the parameters 𝜃𝑘 are not identifiable. Therefore, the likelihood 
is invariant under the permutation of components, i.e., relabeling. To resolve this problem in 
other studies (Young 2008), scholars commonly impose an identifiability constraint on the 
parameters. However, this solution has drawbacks on the inference results. To deal with this 
problem, we use Stephens’s (1997) approach and implement post processing identifiability. 
Although we report label switching in the simulations, the groups were so well separated that 
the identification was straightforward. 
The choice of the constants 𝛿 = (𝛾, 𝜆, 𝜏, 𝜐, 𝛽) is important because it affects the posterior 
distribution. We therefore follow Bensmail et al. (1997) and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2006) to 
choose these constants. Because we are considering a potentially rare segment with a few 
important institutions, we choose 𝛾 = 4. The allocations are initialized with a clustering 
algorithm based on the squared Euclidean distance (K-means), but an alternative approach 
would be to use a Kohonen neural network. Consequently, we have the initial guess for 𝑧, and 
the centroids are the initial values of 𝜆. The priors are proper for 𝜐 > (𝑝 − 1)/2. Hence, we 
choose 𝜐 = 2.5 + (𝑅 − 1), while 𝜏 = 1. Eq. (5) shows that 𝜏 is interpreted as the relative 
weight assigned to the initial guess of the cluster mean. 𝛽 is the product of the covariance 
16 
sampling estimate by a factor that controls the precision. The mean and covariance matrices 
are initialized with the sampling estimates, while 𝜔 and 𝜉 are randomly selected. 
3.3. Model comparison 
As stated before, alternative methods proposed in the literature have made significant 
contributions to our understanding of the evolution of strategic group membership within an 
industry. Therefore, it is of interest to examine the performance of some benchmark models in 
identifying strategic groups. The performance of these models can then be compared with that 
of our proposed model in terms of estimation robustness and the ability to accurately classify 
banks into strategic groups. This model comparison is also important because conclusions 
about strategic group dynamics based on these methods might have strategic as well as 
managerial implications for firms.  
We perform this comparison by applying two prominent methods described in the literature to 
data on the Spanish banking industry for the period 1992 to 2004. We then compare these 
results with those of our proposed model using the same performance criteria. Because 
numerous studies have used cluster analysis to identify strategic groups based on heuristic 
procedures such as k-means, we perform this model clustering for each period. The 
determination of the optimal number of groups cannot be inferred by this model, so we state 
the same number of groups (k) to enable comparison with other models. This basic model has 
weaknesses, so more sophisticated models have been proposed to overcome the limitations of 
cluster analysis. One example is the HMM proposed by Ebbes et al. (2010). The membership 
of a bank is determined using latent states that follow a first-order Markov process. This 
represents a major contribution by simultaneously identifying strategic groups and explicitly 
modeling the long-run transition probabilities for the identified strategic groups described by 
a unique transition matrix. This model is also our main source of inspiration and provides the 
basis for the model presented in this paper.  
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We apply the three aforementioned methods: cluster analysis, HMM, and the model extension 
proposed in this paper. The goal is to infer their performance in identifying strategic groups 
and defining a more accurate picture of the evolution of strategic group membership within an 
industry. To compare the models, we compute the log-likelihood function of the nested 
mixture models. The likelihood function is as follows: 







This expression is the product of the one-step-ahead predictive densities (Frühwirth-Schnatter 
2006). 









3.4. Sample and variables 
Our sample comprises 25 savings banks and 13 commercial banks. Data correspond to a 13-
year period (1992–2004). Boeker (1991) and Burke (1990) report a relationship between a 
bank’s size and geographical spread: National banks are generally larger than regional banks 
are. Furthermore, competition in banking is largely driven by geographical constraints, so 
customers are unwilling to travel for long distances to meet their banking needs (Ebbes et al. 
2010). For these two reasons, the sample comprises the largest financial entities in Spain in 
terms of assets. We therefore study private banks and savings banks with a national and 
regional scope and extensive branch networks. Consequently, this sample excludes smaller 
financial entities that focus on local markets. 
We analyze empirical data on the Spanish banking industry for the period after the end of the 
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deregulation process in 1992. The subsequent increase in competition was a prominent 
characteristic of this period, resulting in critical changes in bank customers’ behavior. The study 
period is characterized by an economic crisis that took place between 1992 and 1996, followed 
by drastic change in the national economic cycle starting with strong recovery in 1997.  
Numerous variables can be used to identify strategic groups in the banking industry. We use a 
series of key strategic dimensions to identify the strategic groups (Ebbes et al. 2010; Frazier 
& Howell 1983; Lewis & Thomas 1990). SD1it is the total monetary value of loans issued in 
year t. We define loans to include the sum of loans to entities and loans to customers reported 
on the balance sheet. SD2it is the interest rate on loans issued by bank i in year t. Because 
banks’ interest rates are not reported, we estimate the annual average for each bank based on 
ratios of loan revenues, including the ratio of fee income to the value of outstanding loans. 
The evolution of this series over time closely resembles that of the market interest rate cited 
by the Bank of Spain (Carbó et al. 2009). SD3it is the total value of deposits for bank i in year 
t. We define deposits as the sum of deposits from customers, deposits represented by 
negotiable shares, and other deposits reported on the balance sheet. SD4it is the interest rate 
for deposits issued by bank i in year t. Because banks’ interest rates are not reported, for each 
bank, we estimate the annual average interest rate on deposits based on ratios of deposit 
expenses, including the ratio of fee expenses to the value of outstanding deposits. SD5it is the 
price of labor (i.e., personnel costs divided by number of employees) for bank i in year t. 
SD6it is the price of capital (i.e., operating costs other than personnel costs divided by fixed 
assets) for bank i in year t. SD7it is the operating costs for bank i in year t. This value was 
derived by multiplying the price of inputs by the quantity of inputs. SD8it is the number of 
ATMs for bank i in year t. This variable is an indirect indicator of the technological expansion 
of bank i (Martín & Sáez 1997), which directly affects its operating costs. SD9it is the ratio of 
assets to number of employees of bank i in year t. This variable reflects the volume of assets 
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managed by each employee at firm i (García et al. 1998). SD10it is the regional GDP, which is 
an indicator of the economic activity in the bank’s market (Lago & Salas 2005). This variable 
is computed for each firm as the branch-weighted average of GDP for regions where bank i 
operates (Maudos 2001). SD11it is the Herfindahl index, which indicates the concentration 
and power of bank i in year t. SD12it is the number of branches of bank i in year t. Finally, 
SD13it is an advertising index defined as the share of non-wage expenditure on total 
administrative costs for bank i in year t. This index is supposed to reflect the amount that bank i 
spends on advertising and other marketing activities to attract new customers (Barros & 
Modesto 1999). 
We use a set of variables that capture information on rivals to test competition within the 
different strategic groups. For bank i in year t, SD14it is the weighted average interest rate on 
loans issued by rival banks. Following Carbó et al. (2009), we calculate this variable as a 
weighted average of the market size of the provinces where the bank has branches. The relative 
importance of each province to that bank’s branch network is used to weight this average. For 
bank i in year t, SD15it is the weighted average interest rate on deposits made in rival banks. 
SD16it captures the branch networks of the rivals of bank i in year t. Variables SD15it and SD16it 
are measured for each bank using a similar weighting system as the one used for SD14it to 
characterize the market where bank i operates.  
We also adopt the theory-based empirical approach proposed by Dranove et al. (1998). Under 
this approach, a strategic group exists if the performance of a firm is a function of group 
characteristics, after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Therefore, after 
identifying the strategic groups, we measure differences across strategic groups using 
performance variables (consistent with Ebbes et al. (2010), and DeSarbo & Grewal (2008), 
among others). We use these differences to externally validate the identification of strategic 
groups because groups should also differ in terms of other variables besides those used in the 
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estimation method (Dant & Gundlach 1999). To assess bank performance and the effectiveness 
of bank strategies, we use the following variables: SD17it: loans to total assets; SD18it: deposits 
to total assets; SD19it: loans per employee; SD20it: deposits per employee; SD21it: Lerner index 
or net profit margin on loans; SD22it: Lerner index or net profit margin on deposits; SD23it: 
marginal operating costs of loans; and SD24it: marginal operating costs of deposits. Because a 
bank’s marginal cost is also part of the Lerner indices, we consider a translog function (Mas-
Ruiz & Ruiz-Moreno 2017). This functional form is common in the analysis of banking 
markets because it deals with economies of scale and scope in multiproduct firms. This 
function has two inputs (labor and physical capital) and two outputs (loans and deposits). Its 
estimations allow us to calculate the marginal operating costs for every bank and the Lerner 
indices for loans and deposits. The AEB (Asociación Española de Banca), and the CECA 
(Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros) publish the necessary information to compute 
these variables. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The study covers 38 banks, 13 strategic dimensions, 3 variables for measuring competition, and 
8 performance variables based on annual data for the period 1992 to 2004. The data are 
arranged in a 494 by 24 matrix. We standardize the strategic dimensions used in the estimation 
procedure to ensure that the same scale is used. Data processing is performed using Matlab. We 
estimate the proposed model for K = 2, …,10 strategic groups in the banking industry. The 
model selection criterion is the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978). The BIC 
suggests that K = 2 is the number of groups that best fits the data. As described earlier, to 
estimate the parameters of the probability distribution, we use Monte Carlo simulation with 
10,000 steps, discarding the first 10% (burn-in period) to ensure the stability of the results. 
Table 1 shows the classification of banks for 2004. 
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Table 1. Classification of banks into two strategic groups for 2004 
Strategic Group #1 Strategic Group #2 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya BBVA 
Banco Santander  
Caja Madrid  
La Caixa  
Banesto   
Citibank España  
Banco Pastor  
Bancaja  
Banco de Andalucía  
Banco de Valencia  
Banco Guipuzcoano 
Banco Popular Español  
Banco Sabadell  
Banco Urquijo  
Barclays Bank  
Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa  
Caja Ahorros Inmaculada  
Caixa Catalunya  
Caixa Galicia  
Caixanova 
Caixapenedes  
Caja de Ahorros de Navarra  
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo 
Caja de Burgos  
Caja Duero  
Caja España  
Caja General de Ahorros de Granada  
Caja Murcia  
Caja San Fernando 
Cajastur  
CajaSur  
Caja Castilla La Mancha  
Deutsche Bank SAE  






Because we analyze the composition of both strategic groups for the period 1992 to 2004, we 
are able to quantitatively identify lines of continuity for banks. Thus, we can identify the group 
that the bank belonged to for the majority of the study period. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya BBVA, 
Banco Santander, Caja Madrid, and La Caixa were included in strategic group 1 (SG1) for 
much of the study period. Banesto started in strategic group 2 (SG2), but switched to SG1 in 
1998 and remained in SG1, except in 2001. The aforementioned five entities in SG1 are also the 
largest in the banking industry. Finally, Citibank belonged primarily to SG2 although it 
sporadically moved to SG1 (in 2001 and 2004). Between 2002 and 2004, some banks (e.g., 
Banco Sabadell, Banco Urquijo, Barclays Bank, Caixapenedes, and Cajastur) temporarily 
belonged to SG1. Switching between clusters does not seem random. In fact, patterns emerge. 
To measure this behavior we use transition matrices shown in Table 2. Therefore, Table 2 
shows the probability that a bank switches from strategic group 1 or 2, in rows, to strategic 
group 1 or 2, in columns. Each sub-table is identified by the initial year and the final year. The 
percentages on the diagonal therefore reflect the probability that a bank remains in the same 
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group. Row probabilities add up to one, meaning that a bank that belongs to group i (i = 1,2) 
can only stay in the same group or switch to the other group. Notably, according to Eq. (5), the 
results are an average of the last samples draws from the posterior distribution, Eq. (2). Thus, 
the entries in the transition matrices are the average of the last 9,000 sample points for each 
yearly transition. 
Table 2. Transition matrices between groups 
Year Strategic group  Year Strategic group 
1992–1993 1 2  1998–1999 1 2 
1 90.44% 9.56%  1 89.98% 10.02% 
2 41.76% 58.24%  2 35.65% 64.35% 
1993–1994 1 2  1999–2000 1 2 
1 89.36% 10.64%  1 84.66% 15.34% 
2 48.27% 51.73%  2 42.77% 57.23% 
1994–1995 1 2  2000–2001 1 2 
1 88.04% 11.96%  1 86.21% 13.79% 
2 45.08% 54.92%  2 45.26% 54.74% 
1995–1996 1 2  2001–2002 1 2 
1 90.71% 9.29%  1 90.26% 9.74% 
2 36.57% 63.43%  2 30.88% 69.12% 
1996–1997 1 2  2002–2003 1 2 
1 86.02% 13.98%  1 87.79% 12.21% 
2 36.22% 63.78%  2 30.56% 69.44% 
1997–1998 1 2  2003–2004 1 2 
1 87.83% 12.17%  1 76.03% 23.97% 
2 30.72% 69.28%  2 34.19% 65.81% 
Average 1 2     
1 87.28% 12.72%     
2 38.16% 61.84%     
  
The last matrix, named Average, summarizes the information for all periods. It can be 
considered the transition matrix for the whole data period. It reflects the high probability of 
remaining in the same group. The probability of remaining in SG1 is 87.28%, and the 
probability of remaining in SG2 is 61.84%. The Average matrix also reflects the low probability 
of switching groups. The probability of switching from SG1 to SG2 is 12.72%, and the 
probability of switching from SG2 to SG1 is 38.16%. Additionally, Figure 1 shows the 
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transition probabilities over time. The blue and red lines denote the probability of starting in 
SG1 and remaining in SG1 or switching to SG2, respectively. At any given time, the sum of the 
corresponding points on both lines is equal to 1. The behavior of both probability lines reflects 
the stability over time. Only for the last period does the probability of switching from SG1 to 
SG2 increase to almost 24%.  
Figure 1. Evolution of transition probabilities  
 
The purple and green lines show the probability of starting in SG2 and remaining in SG2 or 
switching to SG1, respectively. Although banks are more likely to stay in SG2 once they are 
there, the way that these curves evolve is complex. Indeed, there is a high probability of 
switching to SG1 in periods 2 and 9 and of staying in SG2 in other periods. As before, at any 
given time, the sum of the corresponding points on both lines is equal to 1. This behavior 
suggests that banks in SG2 might evolve for long periods in terms of group membership. For 
example, banks in SG2 were more likely to switch to SG1 between 1997 and 2001, which 
corresponds to an economic recovery period in which mergers were taking place in the Spanish 
banking market. This transformation in the banking industry offered a new opportunity for 
banks in SG2 to modify their strategies in response to the new competitive environment. In 
contrast, banks in SG1 appear to be more stable over time, with low levels of switching 
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After aggregating over the entire period, we present the descriptive statistics for the strategic 
dimensions (unstandardized form) used in the identification of the strategic groups shown in 
Table 3. The information is presented in general terms and by strategic group. 
Table 3. Summary statistics for the two strategic groups in the Spanish banking sector 
Variable Overall mean Overall SD SG Mean SD 
SD1it: quantity of loans 12,544,999 21,869,379 
SG1 57,678,799 39,274,379 
SG2 7,005,850 8,339,919 
SD2it: interest rate for loans 0.101 0.040 
SG1 0.092 0.035 
SG2 0.103 0.041 
SD3it: quantity of deposits 11,582,853 19,719,999 
SG1 51,898,118 36,036,869 
SG2 6,635,071 7,447,541 
SD4it: interest rate for deposits 0.044 0.029 
SG1 0.050 0.039 
SG2 0.043 0.027 
SD5it: price of labor 45.051 8.883 
SG1 52.449 8.00 
SG2 44.143 8.563 
SD6it: price of capital 0.494 0.972 
SG1 0.879 2.516 
SG2 0.447 0.526 
SD7it: operating costs 566,633 1,033,656 
SG1 2,719,365 1,695,634 
SG2 302,434 461,247 
SD8it: number of ATMs 759.50 1,157.49 
SG1 3,171.96 2,018.54 
SG2 463.43 457.08 
SD9it: assets/employees 3,488.97 1,594.26 
SG1 4,978.65 1,926.45 
SG2 3,306.14 1,449.07 
SD10it: regional GDP 27,297,294 21,369,153 
SG1 42,885,908 19,122,516 
SG2 25,384,145 20,859,144 
SD11it: Herfindahl index 0.170 0.034 
SG1 0.157 0.012 
SG2 0.172 0.036 
SD12it: branch networks 661.45 802.36 
SG1 2,397.41 1,153.30 
SG2 448.40 382.38 
SD13it: advertising index 0.321 0.059 
SG1 0.314 0.075 
SG2 0.322 0.057 
 
Table 3 provides statistics for the variables for each group. The results indicate that the means 
and standard deviations are well separated because of a clear classification of the banks. The 
results also indicate major differences between the strategic groups for many of the variables 
that were used for their identification. The values of strategic dimensions such as quantity of 
loans and deposits, operating costs, number of ATMs, assets per employee, and branch 
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networks are larger for SG1 than for SG2. These findings support the assertion at the beginning 
of this section about the size of the banks in SG1. In fact, deregulation and the institutional 
structure in the Spanish banking industry mean that size is a defining characteristic of this 
market. Hence, certain scholars (e.g., Freixas 1996; Más-Ruiz et al. 2005) have used size to 
identify strategic groups. The strategic dimension of regional GDP indicates that banks in SG1 
have a national scope and a strong presence in the major cities. Many banks that belong to SG2 
have a stronger presence in a few regional markets, but only a few symbolic branches in the rest 
of the national market. Some other strategic dimensions such as the Herfindahl index and the 
prices of labor and capital also reveal major differences between SG1 and SG2. Finally, minor 
differences emerge for some strategic dimensions such as advertising ratio and interest rates on 
loans and deposits.  
We also examine some variables (SD14–SD16) that reflect competition within each group and 
some bank performance variables (SD17–SD24) that measure differences between groups to 
provide external validity and support this classification of strategic groups. These variables 
appear in Table 4. We use ANOVA to detect significant differences. The results in Table 4 do 
not show significant differences in rivals’ interest rates on loans and deposits. These variables 
measure the prices for loans and deposits over a 13-years period. Differences might be diluted 
over such a long period because price wars in the loans and deposits markets are more common 
over short periods. However, the variable that indicates the competition using the strategic 
variable of the branch network reflects a significant difference between groups. Thus, the 
branch structure of the Spanish banking industry is the result of rivalry in a context of 
regulated prices; the broadest branch networks belong to the largest firms, which can provide 
their clients with the most convenient service. In fact, large Spanish banks achieve economies 
of scale by increasing their number of accounts per branch. Product differentiation is inherent 
to market leadership because most consumers apply the “what the majority buys must be the 
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best” selection criterion to reduce the costs of searching for the best deal, which constitutes a 
major advantage (Rhoades 1985). 
Table 4. Competition and performance variables 
Variable Total mean Total SD Sig. By SG Mean SD 
Competition variables 
SD14it: rivals’ interest rates 
for loans 
0.096 0.039 0.939 
SG1 0.095 0.039 
SG2 0.096 0.039 
SD15it: rivals’ interest rates 
for deposits 
0.047 0.030 0.352 
SG1 0.044 0.029 
SG2 0.048 0.030 
SD16it: rivals’ branch 
network 
1,119.54 786.99 <.0001 
SG1 1,555.60 423.32 
SG2 1,066.02 804.76 
Performance variables 
SD17it: loans to total assets 0.751 0.233 0.035 
SG1 0.688 0.078 
SG2 0.759 0.245 
SD18it: deposits to total 
assets 
0.722 0.269 0.0002 
SG1 0.592 0.145 
SG2 0.738 0.276 
SD19it: loans per employee 2,564.11 1,156.02 <.0001 
SG1 3,394.65 1,262.34 
SG2 2,462.18 1,101.42 
SD20it: deposits per 
employee 
2,464.94 1,179.92 0.0005 
SG1 2,988.69 1,333.94 
SG2 2,400.66 1,144.88 
SD21it: loans Lerner index 0.209 0.188 0.543 
SG1 0.194 0.201 
SG2 0.211 0.187 
SD22it: deposits Lerner index -0.192 0.434 <.0001 
SG1 -0.802 0.460 
SG2 -0.117 0.368 
SD23it: loans marginal costs 0.023 0.014 0.0642 
SG1 0.027 0.018 
SG2 0.022 0.014 
SD24it: deposits marginal 
costs 
0.031 0.025 <.0001 
SG1 0.046 0.039 
SG2 0.029 0.023 
 
The results highlight significant differences between groups for most performance variables 
used to externally validate the classification. Almost all performance variables are statistically 
different between the groups. The largest banks in SG1 perform better than banks in SG2 with 
respect to variables that relate to the quantity of loans and deposits per employee. These 
variables are indicators of efficiency and economies of scale in the largest banks. However, 
banks in SG1 have lower ratios of loans and deposits to total assets than do banks in SG2. 
Despite significant differences in the estimated marginal operating costs of loans and deposits, 
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banks in SG1 seemingly have higher marginal operating costs, especially in deposits. It is also 
notable that the Lerner index in deposits is negative but significantly different between banks in 
SG1 and SG2. Although deposits are not a profitable product in themselves, they allow banks to 
capture and retain customers. Through this tying arrangement, deposits allow banks to exercise 
market power in the loan market (Carbó et al. 2009). Finally, these performance differences 
among groups support our approach and the approach by Dranove et al. (1998), according to 
which strategic groups exist if there are performance differences between these groups. 
4.1. Results of model comparison 
The optimal number of strategic groups, k = 2, for the HMM implemented by Ebbes et al. 
(2010) matches the number for our extended model (hereinafter HMM2). For the cluster 
analysis, the optimal number of groups cannot be inferred by this method. Therefore, we 
estimate this method for k = 2 groups to enable direct comparison between the three methods. 
The resulting grouping is similar but not identical for the three approaches. Both dynamic 
models, HMM and HMM2, group banks on a stable basis throughout the time period and yield 
the same classification of banks for the two groups in terms of the median. However, the 
classification using the k-means algorithm is more inconsistent along the analyzed period. In 
this classification, Caja Madrid is not part of SG1. Table 5 summarizes the results of the 
classification of banks into strategic groups based on the estimation of the three models: cluster 
analysis, HMM, and the HMM2 model proposed in this paper.  
Table 5. Comparison of classification of banks into strategic groups (in terms of median in the 
time period) 
Bank Cluster analysis HMM HMM2 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya BBVA SG1 SG1 SG1 
Banco Santander  SG1 SG1 SG1 
Caja Madrid  SG2 SG1 SG1 
La Caixa  SG1 SG1 SG1 
Other banks SG2 SG2 SG2 
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Having obtained the optimized log-likelihoods, we use two criteria to compare the models. We 
employ Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). Table 6 shows the results of the pairwise comparison of the 
different models.  
Table 6. Model comparison  
Fitted models  Cluster HMM  Cluster HMM2  HMM HMM2 
Log-likelihood  -866.6 7698.7  -866.6 7314.8  7698.7 7314.8 
AIC  6543.1 -10587.3  6543.1 -9819.5  -10587.3 -9819.5 
BIC  31567.3 14436.8  31567.3 15204.7  14436.8 15204.7 
 
Both dynamic models, HMM and HMM2, fit the data better than the cluster analysis. This 
observation is supported by the values for the AIC and BIC. Regarding the comparison of the 
two dynamic models, although the HMM has the best fit to the Spanish banking data, this 
difference is small, and the log-likelihood values are quite similar. As expected, both dynamic 
models fit the data significantly better than the cluster analysis and perform similarly (see AIC 
and BIC). However, the enhanced version presented in this paper explicitly models the 
transition matrix for every pair of years (t and t+1) within the study period instead of providing 
a unique general transition matrix for the whole period. This model enhancement improves the 
set of available tools to enable more accurate analysis of the dynamics of strategic groups. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
One of the primary goals of the recent strategic group research is to develop theoretical and 
methodological techniques to improve the identification of group dynamics over time. We are 
aware of the importance of studying the dynamics of strategic groups to understand how 
competitive dynamics change over time (Ebbes et al. 2010). We therefore propose a hidden 
Markov model (HMM) to examine the dynamics of strategic groups for a given period. We 
29 
estimate the switching behavior of banks that move from one group to another on a yearly 
basis to show the dynamic strategic group structure of the Spanish banking industry. The 
primary contribution of this empirical research is to model the development of the strategic 
groups using a time inhomogeneous HMM, for which the time-variable transition matrix 
captures institutions’ group switching behavior for every pair of years (t and t+1) included in 
the study period. We allow for time-varying parameters in the distributions, thereby 
accounting for the dynamics of the strategic groups. From a technical perspective, our prior 
initial values are more general than those of Ebbes et al. (2010). This aspect adds flexibility 
when controlling the amount of information included in the priors. 
Two strategic groups in the Spanish banking industry are detected. These groups are primarily 
characterized by size and other strategic dimensions. Results show that banks in SG1 are 
highly likely to remain in this group and that banks in SG2 are less likely to do so. We also 
detect a low probability of switching groups: approximately 12.72% probability of switching 
from SG1 to SG2 and 38.16% probability of switching from SG2 to SG1. Thus, banks in SG1 
appear to be more stable over time, with low transients and well-defined long-term behavior. 
In contrast, the group membership of banks in SG2 might evolve over long periods. 
One limitation of this research is the need for a longer study period to use more years of data 
to establish a converging path or trend. The importance and role of each strategic dimension 
in the identification of strategic groups is unknown. It would therefore be useful to determine 
the role of each strategic dimension to help the bank improve its general strategy. Another 
limitation of this study relates to the study setting. The study is based on Spanish data. It 
should be extended to global markets to enhance the robustness of the conclusions. On the 
model side, further studies should vary the number of clusters from year to year to allow for 
different numbers of strategic groups over time. Allowing for a different number of groups 
each year would help with group formation to determine the degree of fragmentation of the 
30 
market at a given time. Also, the model would benefit from a balance between parsimony and 
a better fit to the data. The variables could be selected dynamically, in the same process of 
convergence, and the algorithm could detect the key variables to determine the strategic 
groups and eliminate the variables that are not used for such a purpose. Finally, although this 
model captures the way in which strategic groups change over time in response to changes in 
market conditions, greater consideration should be given to the interplay between firm, group, 
and industry characteristics in the analysis of strategic group dynamics (Schimmer & Brauer 
2012). Therefore, the study of how firm characteristics can explain dynamic changes would 
be an interesting avenue for future research. 
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